UFC Fighter Pay and the Le v. Zuffa Antitrust Settlement

Timeline

1. Dec 2014Cung Le, Jon Fitch, Nate Quarry and other former fighters file an antitrust class action against Zuffa.
2. Jul 2016Zuffa is sold to a group led by WME–IMG (later Endeavor) for $4.025 billion.
3. Apr 2023Endeavor announces the merger of the UFC and WWE into TKO Group Holdings.
4. Aug 2023Judge Richard Boulware certifies a class of fighters.
5. Jul 2024Boulware rejects a proposed $335 million settlement.
6. Feb 6, 2025Boulware grants final approval of a $375 million settlement; the related Johnson v. Zuffa case continues.

The ethical issues

• Monopsony power: whether a dominant buyer of fighters' services suppressed their pay.
• Contract terms: exclusivity, renewal and promotional rights that restrict fighters' options.
• Absence of collective bargaining: fighters are classified as independent contractors without a union.
• Health and career length: compensation for a brief, dangerous career.
• Settlement adequacy: whether a negotiated sum is fair to class members.

Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Interests & obligations
Fighters	Pay, career options and long-term health.
UFC, Zuffa and TKO	Business model, brand control and profitability.
Rival promotions	Ability to compete for talent.
Fans and broadcasters	Access to top fights and matchups.
Courts and regulators	Applying antitrust law to a dominant promotion.

The case

The Ultimate Fighting Championship grew from a fringe event in the 1990s into the dominant global promotion for mixed martial arts. Zuffa, the company that bought the UFC in 2001, acquired rival promotions and signed most of the world’s top fighters to exclusive contracts.^[1] In 2016, Zuffa was sold to a group led by the talent agency WME–IMG, later Endeavor, for $4.025 billion.^[1][6] In 2023, Endeavor merged the UFC with the professional wrestling company WWE to form TKO Group Holdings.^[1][7]

UFC fighters are classified as independent contractors. They have no union and no collective bargaining agreement. Their contracts typically grant the UFC exclusive promotional rights for a set number of bouts, along with renewal options and rights to their names and likenesses.^[1]

Background

Frank and Lorenzo Fertitta bought the UFC for $2 million in January 2001 and created Zuffa as its parent company.^[1] Its growth involved buying rivals. In December 2006, Zuffa acquired World Extreme Cagefighting (WEC), in part to stop the International Fight League from reaching a deal with the cable network Versus. On March 12, 2011, it announced the purchase of Strikeforce.^[1] The UFC also absorbed Japan’s PRIDE Fighting Championships.^[1]

The suits were filed in a cluster. Several class actions were filed in late 2014 and early 2015, including a third case filed by Vera and another fighter on December 24, 2014.^[1] The UFC said that month that it was “proud of the company we have built, confident in our legal position, and intend to prevail in this lawsuit.”^[1]

The rules and governance

The claims rested on Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which bars monopolization. In monopsony cases, the harm is depressed pay for the sellers of labor rather than higher prices for consumers.^[2][4] Evidence the plaintiffs cited became public during the case. According to Wikipedia’s summary of those filings, fighter compensation was 18.6% to 20.5% of UFC revenue from 2011 to 2013, compared with about 63% at Strikeforce and 44.7% at Bellator. The plaintiffs also pointed to evidence that keeping athlete pay below 25% was part of the UFC’s business strategy.^[1] The class Boulware certified covered more than 1,200 fighters who competed between December 2010 and June 2017. They sought $800 million to $1.6 billion in damages.^[1]

Fighters’ advocates also pointed to federal law outside antitrust. The lead plaintiffs’ advocate said he hoped for reforms similar to boxing’s Ali Act of 2000.^[1]

The lawsuit

In December 2014, a group of former fighters, including Cung Le, Jon Fitch, Brandon Vera and Nate Quarry, filed an antitrust class action against Zuffa. They alleged that the UFC had illegally maintained monopoly and monopsony power, meaning power as the dominant buyer of elite fighters’ services. They claimed it did this through long exclusive contracts, by acquiring or starving rival promotions, and by using its control of top fighters to keep others from competing. The result, they argued, was that fighters received a much smaller share of revenue than they would have in a competitive market.^[2][5] The UFC denied the claims and argued that its contracts were standard and its success reflected the quality of its product.^[2]

The case moved slowly. In August 2023, Judge Richard Boulware certified a class of fighters who competed in UFC bouts between 2010 and 2017, and the case was set for trial.^[2]

The 80-page order certified a “Bout Class” of fighters in live UFC bouts held or broadcast in the United States from December 16, 2010, to June 30, 2017, covering more than 1,200 members. It refused to certify a separate “Identity Class” for use of fighters’ names and likenesses.^[8] The order was not a verdict. It found that the plaintiffs’ evidence could be tested on a class-wide basis, and it left many disputes “for the jury.”^[8] The evidence was nonetheless pointed. The plaintiffs’ economist estimated that Zuffa’s share of the market for fighter services ran between 94% and 99% on one measure, and between 71% and 91% on another. The three largest rival promoters together never had more than 9% of revenue after 2009.^[8] The court described the contracts’ exclusivity, exclusive-negotiation and other clauses, and found that the plaintiffs had shown “a variety of ruthless coercive techniques to prevent fighters from becoming free agents—rendering these contracts effectively perpetual.” Because fighters were paid only when they fought, control over the timing, opponents and placement of bouts could push them to re-sign early.^[8] The order quoted a 2010 message in which a UFC matchmaker wrote, “I lowballed them on purpose the first offer knowing they would turn it down,” and proposed, if the fighter refused, to put him “in a prelim against a really tough guy for his last fight.”^[8] It also cited a presentation by the parent company WME–IMG. That presentation put fighter costs at 16% to 19% of revenue from 2012 to 2015 and called “Fighter Compensation Inflation” “a critical cost that we must actively manage,” with management aiming to keep fighter costs at no more than 20%.^[8]

The settlements

In 2024, the parties proposed a $335 million settlement that would also have resolved a second case, Johnson v. Zuffa, covering later years. Boulware rejected it. He was concerned that the amount was too low for the fighters and that the deal left no room for injunctive relief, that is, court-ordered changes to the UFC’s practices.^[2][4] A month later, the parties agreed to a $375 million settlement of the Le case alone, leaving Johnson to proceed.^[2]

Aftermath

On February 6, 2025, Boulware granted final approval. About 1,100 fighters were eligible. According to court filings reported by Courthouse News, class members would receive about $250,000 on average after fees, with dozens receiving more than $1 million.^[2][3] Thirty-five class members were expected to net more than $1 million, and nearly 800 to recover over $50,000. Claims had to be filed after the written order.^[2] Named plaintiff Nate Quarry said, “It feels like we’ve been in a long fight camp for 12 years.” A company spokesperson said, “We are pleased the Le case is now fully resolved.”^[2] The Johnson case, covering fighters from 2017 on, stayed before the same judge. Its aim was to change the UFC’s business practices rather than recover back pay.^[2] Former fighter Gray Maynard said he had worked construction while fighting for the UFC because his pay was not enough to sustain a career.^[2]

The core dilemma

The UFC created the market for elite mixed martial arts and invested heavily in it. Fighters argue that the same dominance allowed the UFC to set their pay without competition. How should the law, and fans, judge a business whose success may rest partly on suppressing its athletes’ bargaining power?

Competing values

• Entrepreneurial reward vs. fair competition: returns for building a sport against the harms of market dominance.
• Contract freedom vs. bargaining power: fighters sign contracts voluntarily, but with few alternatives.
• Settlement certainty vs. full accountability: a payment now against a trial that might have reshaped the business.
• Short careers vs. long-term costs: fighters bear lasting health risks for limited earnings.

Strongest arguments

For the fighters: a dominant promotion that controls the top talent and restricts competitors can dictate pay. The settlement amount and the judge’s insistence on more suggest the claims had substantial force.

For the UFC: it took a marginal sport mainstream, and fighters who succeed have earned more because of that growth. Exclusive contracts are common in entertainment, and settling is not an admission of wrongdoing.

Applying the frameworks

Justice

A justice lens asks how revenue should be shared between a promotion and the athletes whose bodies and careers create the product. It also asks whether a settlement that compensates past fighters without changing contract practices delivers justice.

Rights

A rights lens emphasizes fighters’ freedom to sell their services to competing promotions and to bargain collectively. It asks whether independent-contractor status and long exclusive contracts undermine those rights.

Utilitarian

A utilitarian lens weighs the benefits of a dominant promotion, such as investment, visibility and production quality, against the costs of suppressed pay and limited competition. It asks which market structure best serves fighters, fans and the sport.

Walk it through: the Simple Decision Model

1. Spot the issue. You are a UFC executive in 2011 considering acquiring a rival promotion that pays fighters a much higher share of its revenue. The stakeholders include fighters, rival promotions, fans, broadcasters, investors and regulators. The codes in play are antitrust law and contract law.
2. Gather facts. Why is the rival paying more? Would the acquisition give the company power to set fighter pay? What do the fighters’ contracts allow?
3. Test options. Options: (a) acquire and integrate the rival; (b) acquire but improve fighter pay and contract terms; (c) compete without acquiring. Weigh growth and market dominance against fairness to fighters and legal risk.
4. Check codes and law. Would the acquisition look acceptable to an antitrust court? Would you accept these contract terms as a fighter?
5. Decide and document. Record the business rationale and the competition analysis.
6. Communicate and follow up. Communicate openly with fighters about pay and contracts, and review compensation policies regularly.

What’s settled and what’s contested

• Settled: the $375 million settlement and its approval; the UFC’s ownership history.
• Contested: whether the UFC’s practices were unlawful; what a fair revenue share would be; the outcome of Johnson v. Zuffa.

Why this case matters

Le v. Zuffa is the leading antitrust challenge to a dominant promoter in combat sports. It shows how athletes without unions turn to antitrust law, and how judges can push for fairer settlements.

Key terms

Agency

An athlete’s ability to make decisions and act independently about their body, career and voice.

Distributive justice

Fairness in how scarce opportunities, resources, benefits and burdens are shared.

Legal but unethical

Law sets out what can be punished; ethics asks what is right. Compliance is a minimum, so an action can be lawful and still wrong.

Commercialization

The process of turning sport into a product and a business enterprise, with profit pressures that can compete with principle.

Definitions from the Ethics Cases glossary.

Discussion questions

1. The UFC built mixed martial arts into a global business. Does that success justify its contract practices? Why or why not?
2. Fighters are independent contractors without a union. Should they be able to bargain collectively, and how could that work?
3. The judge rejected a $335 million settlement before approving $375 million. How should a judge decide whether a settlement is fair?
4. What do promoters owe athletes in a sport with short careers and high injury risk?
5. Would a federal law like the boxing-focused Muhammad Ali Act be a better solution than litigation?

Sources

1. Ultimate Fighting Championship — Wikipedia
2. Judge grants final approval of $375 million UFC antitrust settlement after decadelong battle — Courthouse News Service
3. $375 million UFC antitrust settlement gets final approval — MMA Junkie / USA Today
4. Order on Motion – #1064 in Le v. Zuffa, LLC (D. Nev., 2:15-cv-01045) — CourtListener
5. Fighters claim UFC restricts earnings — ESPN
6. Dana White on $4 billion UFC sale: 'Sport is going to the next level' — ESPN
7. UFC, WWE ring bell on new TKO parent company: Merger official — MMA Junkie
8. Le v. Zuffa, LLC, No. 2:15-cv-01045, Order on Motion to Certify Class, ECF No. 839 (D. Nev. Aug. 9, 2023) — U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada (via Justia)