The Mitchell Report and Baseball's Steroid Era

Timeline

1. Mar 17, 2005The House Committee on Government Reform holds a hearing with Mark McGwire, Rafael Palmeiro, Sammy Sosa, Curt Schilling, and Jose Canseco.
2. Aug 2005Palmeiro, who told Congress he had never used steroids, is suspended after a positive test.
3. Mar 30, 2006Commissioner Bud Selig asks former Senator George Mitchell to investigate PED use in baseball.
4. 2006–2007Mitchell's investigators interview hundreds of people; few active players agree to speak, and the union advises members on their rights.
5. Dec 13, 2007The Mitchell Report is released, naming dozens of players and recommending reforms rather than discipline for most past conduct.
6. Feb 13, 2008Roger Clemens and his former trainer Brian McNamee give conflicting testimony to a House committee.
7. Jun 2012A federal jury acquits Clemens of charges that he lied to Congress.

The ethical issues

• Naming without adjudication: players were publicly identified on the strength of informant testimony and documents, with no hearing.
• Collective responsibility: owners, the union, and the commissioner's office had tolerated the culture that individual players were blamed for.
• Independence and conflicts: Mitchell was a director of the Boston Red Sox while investigating MLB.
• Amnesty vs. accountability: Mitchell recommended against discipline for most past conduct, in order to move forward.
• Congressional involvement: should legislators have used hearings to pressure a private league?

Stakeholders

Stakeholder	Interests & obligations
Named players	Reputations, Hall of Fame chances, and legal exposure; a right to answer accusations.
Unnamed clean players	Fair competition and recognition; their careers were measured against inflated statistics.
MLB clubs and the commissioner	Public trust and revenue; responsibility for years of inaction.
MLB Players Association	Defending members' privacy and bargained rights; also duties to clean members.
Informants (Kirk Radomski, Brian McNamee)	Avoiding or reducing criminal exposure in exchange for cooperation; credibility.
Congress and the public	Public health (including youth steroid use) and the integrity of a national pastime.

The case

By 2005, baseball’s power surge of the late 1990s and early 2000s had become an embarrassment. Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa’s 1998 home-run chase had been celebrated as the sport’s revival after the 1994 strike. Then Barry Bonds broke the single-season record in 2001. Questions about steroids followed: from Jose Canseco’s 2005 memoir, from the BALCO grand-jury leaks, and from the absence of meaningful drug testing until 2003. On March 17, 2005, a House committee called McGwire, Sosa, Rafael Palmeiro, Curt Schilling, and Canseco to testify. McGwire repeatedly said he was “not here to talk about the past.” Palmeiro, who wagged his finger and said he had never used steroids, tested positive months later.^[4]

On March 30, 2006, Commissioner Bud Selig asked former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell to lead an investigation.^[4] Mitchell had no subpoena power. Most active players declined to be interviewed, and the Players Association informed its members of their right to decline. The investigation therefore relied largely on two cooperating witnesses who faced federal exposure. One was Kirk Radomski, a former New York Mets clubhouse employee who had pleaded guilty to distributing steroids. The other was Brian McNamee, a former strength coach who had worked for Roger Clemens and Andy Pettitte.^[1][2]

Background

Mitchell was appointed amid the controversy over Game of Shadows, a 2006 book by San Francisco Chronicle reporters Lance Williams and Mark Fainaru-Wada. It described alleged extensive use of steroids and growth hormone by stars including Barry Bonds, Gary Sheffield and Jason Giambi.^[4] The cooperating witnesses shaped what the report could find. Many of the players named were connected through a small social network centered on Radomski.^[4] He had been charged with distributing a controlled substance and money laundering, faced up to 30 years in prison, and after pleading guilty received five years’ probation and a fine of $18,575.^[4] McNamee told the investigation that he began injecting Clemens with steroids in 1998 and continued to supply them through 2001, allegations Clemens denied.^[3][4]

The rules and governance

Baseball’s drug rules were set by collective bargaining, which is why testing came so late. Players on major league 40-man rosters were exempt from testing until 2004.^[4] In 2003 the Players Association agreed to anonymous survey testing. It then discovered that the list of players who tested positive had been turned over to the government as part of the BALCO investigation, which hardened its resistance to cooperation.^[4]

The investigation’s own rules made cooperation risky for players. The union told members that Mitchell could not promise that what they disclosed would not reach a federal or state prosecutor, a congressional committee or a private lawsuit.^[4] Mitchell wrote that the union was “largely uncooperative” and had effectively discouraged players from taking part.^[4] Selig said that some named players might face discipline and that any decisions would be made “swiftly.”^[4]

What the report said

Released on December 13, 2007, the report ran to more than 400 pages.^[1] It concluded that the use of steroids and human growth hormone had been widespread for more than a decade, and that “everyone involved in baseball” shared responsibility: commissioners, club officials, the Players Association, and players. It named 89 current and former players, including stars such as Clemens, and described the evidence against each, usually a check, a mailing receipt, or an informant’s account.^[1][2]

Mitchell explained why he named names: he said a report without them would be incomplete and would leave every player of the era under suspicion. He also recommended that the commissioner not discipline players for past violations except in the most serious cases. Instead he urged reforms: an investigative department in the commissioner’s office, better cooperation with law enforcement, independent and transparent testing, year-round unannounced tests, and education.^[1]

The reaction

Reactions split along predictable lines. Selig called the report a “call to action” and adopted many recommendations. The union, led by Donald Fehr, said players had been named without due process and on the word of witnesses who were cooperating with federal prosecutors to reduce their own sentences.^[2] Some named players admitted use and apologized; Pettitte said he had used HGH to recover from an injury. Clemens denied everything. In February 2008 he and McNamee gave directly conflicting testimony under oath to a House committee.^[3] Clemens was later indicted for lying to Congress, and in June 2012 a jury acquitted him on all counts.^[5]

Critics also pointed to Mitchell’s ties to the game. He was a director of the Boston Red Sox, and the report named relatively few prominent Red Sox players. Mitchell said he disclosed the relationship from the start and that his findings were driven by the evidence available, which came mostly from informants who had worked with other clubs.^[2][4]

Aftermath

The report itself describes how limited the inquiry’s reach was. Investigators tried to contact almost 500 former players and 68 agreed to be interviewed. The union rejected all document requests and allowed one interview, with Fehr. Mitchell sent a memo to every active player inviting contact, and “not one player contacted me in response.” Almost every current player facing an allegation declined to meet.^[1]

Selig did not follow through on discipline. In April 2008 owners and the union agreed a revised drug program that granted amnesty to every player cited in the report. Fifteen-day suspensions already imposed on two players were waived. “There is little to be gained at this point in debating dated misconduct and enduring numerous disciplinary proceedings,” Selig said. In exchange the union agreed to donate $200,000 to anti-drug programs and to have players, including those named, take part in drug education. The deal raised annual tests from 3,000 to 3,600 and expanded off-season testing. It gave the program administrator a three-year term with removal only for cause, though the parties again declined to hand testing to a fully independent body as Mitchell had urged. Selig reserved the right to fine club officials named in the report.^[6]

Shared failure

The report’s most uncomfortable finding was institutional. Owners had profited from attendance and television revenue during the home-run era. The commissioner’s office had been slow to react to reports of steroid use. And the union had resisted testing for years on privacy grounds. Mitchell wrote that the evidence showed “this has not been an isolated problem involving just a few players or a few clubs,” and that each of the 30 clubs had had players involved with performance-enhancing substances at some point.^[1] Yet only players were publicly named, and players bore the reputational costs, from congressional subpoenas to Hall of Fame snubs.

That tension remains. MLB’s testing program today is far stronger than before 2003. Since a March 2014 agreement, a first violation brings an unpaid 80-game suspension, a second a 162-game suspension, and a third a permanent ban, and suspended players cannot take part in that season’s postseason.^[7] Defenders of the report say it forced those reforms. Critics argue that it scapegoated individuals while letting institutions, and the fans who cheered the home runs, avoid blame.

The core dilemma

When cheating has been tolerated by an entire system, is it fair to single out the individuals who can be named? Or does fairness to the clean, and to the truth, require naming names even without a hearing?

Competing values

• Truth-telling vs. due process: a full public account required naming names, but the named had no formal opportunity to contest the evidence.
• Individual vs. institutional responsibility: players chose to dope, but clubs, the union, and the league created the incentives and tolerated the conditions.
• Accountability vs. moving forward: discipline for the past would have been just, but Mitchell judged reform more valuable.
• Independence vs. access: an insider investigator could get cooperation from clubs but carried a perceived conflict.

Strongest arguments

For naming names: without names, every player of the era stays under suspicion, and clean players carry the stain. Public accountability is what moved the union and owners to accept stronger testing.

Against naming names: the evidence came largely from witnesses with a motive to cooperate. Being named in a commissioned report, without a hearing, is a punishment without process, and it fell on players while institutions escaped.

Applying the frameworks

Kantian (duty)

A Kantian lens condemns players who cheated and lied about it, and also asks whether naming players on the word of cooperating witnesses, without a hearing, respected their dignity and rights. Duties applied to the institutions too: owners and officials who looked away failed obligations to the game and to clean players.

Utilitarian

Consequentialists weigh the benefits of exposure, such as reforms, stronger testing and public accountability, against the costs: damaged reputations, possible unfair accusations and a lasting cloud over an era. Mitchell’s recommendation against punishing most past use reflects a forward-looking judgment.

Virtue

Virtue ethics asks what honesty and responsibility required of everyone involved. Players who admitted use and apologized showed some virtue in the aftermath. Institutions that profited from the era and then let players carry the blame showed less.

Walk it through: the Simple Decision Model

1. Spot the issue. You are a player named in the Mitchell Report in December 2007. The stakeholders include you, your family, teammates, your club, fans, the union and young athletes who look up to you. The codes in play are MLB’s drug policy, the collective bargaining agreement and the law.
2. Gather facts. What does the report say about you, and is it accurate? What legal risks do you face if you speak?
3. Test options. Options: (a) deny; (b) say nothing; (c) acknowledge what is true and apologize. Weigh legal advice and reputation against honesty and responsibility to fans.
4. Check codes and law. Are you being truthful with yourself about what happened? Would your statement survive examination under oath?
5. Decide and document. Record your account with legal counsel.
6. Communicate and follow up. Communicate honestly with your family, team and the public, and consider supporting anti-doping education.

What’s settled and what’s contested

• Settled: the report’s existence and recommendations; MLB’s later testing reforms; Clemens’s acquittal on charges of lying to Congress.
• Contested: the accuracy of individual allegations based on informant testimony; whether the investigation was sufficiently independent; how the era should be remembered.

Why this case matters

The Mitchell Report is a model for commissioned investigations and a warning about them. It shows how an organization can use an independent inquiry both to expose a problem and, in effect, to share out the blame for it.

See also: Prescription or Edge? ADHD Stimulant Exemptions in Major League Baseball.

Key terms

Integrity

A commitment to honesty and ethical principle in competition and administration, including when nobody is watching.

Institutional accountability

Structures that make a sport organization explain its decisions and face consequences: clear authority, transparency, appeals, independent oversight and enforcement.

Trust

The public’s belief that what they are watching is real. Integrity failures are ultimately failures of trust.

Codes and guardrails

Written rules of conduct, backed by real consequences, that turn values into expected behavior. Without enforcement they are decoration.

Definitions from the Ethics Cases glossary.

Discussion questions

1. Was it fair for the report to publicly name players who had no opportunity for a hearing? What would a fair alternative have looked like?
2. Who bears the greatest moral responsibility for the steroid era: players, owners, the union, or the commissioner's office? Defend your ranking.
3. Mitchell recommended against punishing most named players. Was that wise, or did it let the institutions avoid the hardest question?
4. Does Mitchell's position as a Red Sox director undermine the report's legitimacy even if the investigation was conducted honestly?
5. Should Hall of Fame voters judge players from this era by different standards? Why or why not?

Sources

1. Report to the Commissioner of Baseball of an Independent Investigation into the Illegal Use of Steroids and Other Performance Enhancing Substances by Players in Major League Baseball — MLB (George J. Mitchell)
2. Mitchell report: Baseball slow to react to players' steroid use — ESPN
3. Clemens fires back, denies taking steroids or HGH — ESPN
4. Mitchell Report (baseball) — Wikipedia
5. Roger Clemens — Wikipedia
6. Owners, union agree on drug policy — Los Angeles Times
7. MLB, MLBPA agree to upgrades of Joint Drug Program — MLB.com