Cases · FIFA · 2026
Selling a Stake in the World Cup? FIFA Forward Enterprise and UEFA's Legal Fight
On July 28, 2026, FIFA president Gianni Infantino unveiled FIFA Forward Enterprise (FFE), a proposed subsidiary that would combine FIFA's commercial rights and tournament operations and take minority investment, with up to USD 40 million per member association on offer. UEFA's 55 members voted to boycott FIFA competitions while the proposal remained alive, Concacaf rejected it and the Asian Football Confederation condemned the lack of consultation. FIFA withdrew the plan three days later. In late August UEFA filed applications in four US federal courts seeking evidence for a contemplated Swiss criminal complaint against Infantino for alleged criminal mismanagement, which FIFA calls 'categorically without merit.' The case asks who owns the World Cup and how a global governing body should decide whether to commercialize it.
Timeline
- FIFA announces the proposed FIFA Forward Enterprise subsidiary and opens a consultation with its 211 member associations.
- UEFA's 55 members agree not to take part in FIFA competitions while the proposal remains alive; Concacaf rejects the plan.
- Infantino says the proposal 'will not proceed.'
- UEFA files four applications in US federal courts seeking discovery for a contemplated Swiss criminal complaint.
- FIFA's US subsidiaries oppose UEFA's Florida application.
- Infantino apologizes to the FIFA Council for mistakes in how FFE was handled; the Council backs a USD 6.35 billion development plan and a governance working group.
The ethical issues
- Whether a governing body can sell stakes in competitions built by its members, players and fans.
- Consultation, transparency and the limits of presidential authority in sport governance.
- Possible conflicts of interest involving advisers and investors.
- Using financial incentives to win member associations' votes.
- Whether a confederation should use courts and criminal law in a dispute inside the football system.
Stakeholders
| Stakeholder | Interests & obligations |
|---|---|
| FIFA and its president | Increasing revenue and development funding, and defending its governance. |
| UEFA and other confederations | Protecting the World Cup from private ownership and their influence in FIFA. |
| FIFA's 211 member associations | Development funding and a voice in decisions. |
| Prospective investors and advisers | A return on investment in FIFA's commercial rights. |
| Players and fans | Competitions run for the sport, not for investors. |
The case
Background
Under its president Gianni Infantino, FIFA’s revenue has grown sharply. FIFA said in July 2026 that its Council had approved a record revenue budget of USD 14 billion for the 2027–2030 cycle.[1] Days after the 2026 World Cup, Infantino proposed going further: placing FIFA’s commercial rights and tournament operations in a new company that outside investors could buy into. Within a week the plan was dead, and within a month UEFA was in US courts preparing a criminal complaint against him. The case asks who owns the World Cup and how a global governing body should decide whether to commercialize it.
The rules and governance
FIFA is an association of 211 member national associations, organized into regional confederations, including UEFA in Europe (55 members), Concacaf in North and Central America and the Caribbean, and the Asian Football Confederation (AFC).[5][8] Major decisions go to the FIFA Council, which includes representatives of the confederations,[6] and to the Congress of member associations; Infantino said FFE would proceed “if, and only if, it is approved by the majority of our 211 Member Associations and the FIFA Council.”[1] BBC Sport reported that a majority meant at least 106 votes.[8]
The proposal
FIFA opened what it called a seven-week consultation on July 28, 2026.[1] FFE would bring FIFA’s commercial rights, “spanning broadcast, sponsorship, licensing, ticketing, hospitality and new ventures,” together with the operational delivery of its tournaments.[1] BBC Sport reported that FIFA would “invite third parties to make minority, non-controlling investments” in the subsidiary, and that FIFA said Thrive Eternal was expected to lead the investor group. Thrive is a venture capital firm founded by Joshua Kushner.[8]
FIFA said that if the plan were approved, FIFA Forward development funding would rise from USD 8 million per member association in 2023–26 to USD 20 million for 2027–2030, with an option to access a further USD 20 million through a new “Fast Forward” programme, for a potential total of USD 40 million per association.[1] Associations had until September 19 to sign up to access the initial funding.[8] Infantino called FFE “a golden opportunity to turbocharge the development of the game globally” and insisted it was “an opportunity but not an obligation.” He said FIFA would continue “to govern football without any external interference.”[1]
The backlash
Confederations said they had been blindsided. AFC president Sheikh Salman bin Ebrahim Al Khalifa wrote to his members that the AFC “was not consulted by FIFA at any level prior to the public announcement of this proposal” and had received no detailed “governance, financial or legal analysis,” which he called “totally unacceptable.”[5]
On July 30, after an emergency meeting, UEFA said its 55 members “unanimously and unequivocally reject FIFA’s proposal to transfer ownership interests in the World Cup and other FIFA competitions to private investors.” It declared that “no UEFA national teams will participate in any FIFA competition for so long as these proposals remain alive,” unless the plan was abandoned and FIFA gave “binding assurances” that it would “never again open its governance or competitions to private ownership.”[5][6] UEFA said national associations faced an ultimatum and called it “governance by intimidation.”[6] Concacaf and its 41 members rejected the proposal the same day, citing “the need for greater transparency and proper governance,” but did not join the boycott.[5]
FIFA initially responded that “nobody is selling football,” and that without the support of its members “FFE would not be established.”[7] But inside FIFA, the chief operating officer said the administration had been “deceived” about the project, and senior adviser Carlos Cordeiro resigned, calling it “a bad deal for football,” BBC Sport reported.[8]
Late on July 31, Infantino said the project had “created divisions of a nature that, regardless of the level of support, are no longer in the interest of the objective set out in the first place.” He concluded: “this proposal will not proceed.”[2]
UEFA goes to court
On August 27 and 28, UEFA filed four applications under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, a US law that allows federal courts to order discovery for use in foreign proceedings. They targeted FIFA’s US subsidiaries in Florida, Thrive and Joshua Kushner in New York, J.P. Morgan and two of its executives in New York, and adviser Greg Maffei and his firm in Colorado.[4][11] UEFA said it and others were “preparing to bring criminal claims in Switzerland against Infantino and possibly other Fifa officials and advisors for criminal mismanagement.”[9]
In its Florida application, as reported by BBC Sport, UEFA alleged that FFE “was a vehicle for Infantino and that small circle to acquire a permanent stake in and otherwise profit from Fifa’s most valuable assets,” that internal approval had come at “a hastily convened meeting” where staff were given “mere hours” to sign off, and that USD 4.2 billion for a stake implied an enterprise value of about USD 20 billion that was “neither the product of an open, competitive auction, nor tested by any independent valuer.”[9]
FIFA’s US subsidiaries opposed the Florida application on September 28. According to Football Business News, FIFA called UEFA’s suggestion that Infantino violated any law or ethical principle “categorically without merit,” argued that UEFA had confused equity value with enterprise value, said the plan would have required approval by the Council and member associations, and argued that the action was meant to influence the next FIFA presidential election.[10] The subsidiaries also argued that UEFA had no right to such discovery because no Swiss proceeding exists, UEFA would have no procedural rights in one, and FIFA’s statutes require disputes to go to arbitration.[11] As of October 16, 2026, no court had ruled on any of the four applications, and no one had been charged.[11]
Aftermath
At the FIFA Council meeting on October 15, 2026, Infantino apologized “for the mistakes made in terms of how the project was conducted and communicated,” and FIFA said FFE “has been permanently withdrawn and will not reappear in any form.” The Council backed a proposal to use part of FIFA’s reserves to raise development funding for 2027–2030 to USD 6.35 billion, including USD 25 million per member association, subject to approval at the March 2027 Congress, and set up a working group to examine FIFA’s governance framework.[3] FIFA said details of the project’s legal background “remain confidential due to ongoing legal proceedings in the United States.”[3]
The core dilemma
FIFA argued that private capital and expertise could unlock value and send more money to poorer member associations. Opponents argued that the World Cup belongs to the football community and that the plan was developed without proper consultation, with large payments offered for support. After the withdrawal, UEFA faced a second dilemma: whether to keep the dispute within football’s governance or use courts and criminal law to pursue accountability.
Competing values
- Development vs. ownership: more money for member associations versus keeping the World Cup out of private hands.
- Executive initiative vs. consultation: leaders proposing bold changes versus institutions deciding together.
- Incentives vs. inducements: funding offers versus pressure on votes.
- Accountability vs. escalation: legal scrutiny versus deepening division.
Strongest arguments
For FIFA’s position: FFE was presented as a proposal subject to consultation and a majority vote, and it was withdrawn when it divided the sport.[1][2] FIFA said its goal was more development funding, and it rejects UEFA’s allegations.[1][10] The Council later moved to increase development funding and review governance.[3]
For UEFA’s position: Confederations were not consulted before the announcement.[5] FIFA’s own chief operating officer said the administration had been deceived.[8] UEFA alleges that the valuation was untested and the internal approval rushed.[9] Without external pressure, UEFA argues, FIFA rarely changes course.[9]
Applying the frameworks
Kantian (duty)
Kant requires that people be treated as ends, which in an institution means respecting members’ rational consent. A plan announced before consultation, with a short deadline and large payments for support, risks treating member associations as means to an end. Kant also asks whether UEFA’s legal campaign aims at accountability or at removing a rival, a question about its maxim.
Utilitarian
A utilitarian weighs potential gains in development funding against the risks of private ownership of football’s most valuable asset, loss of trust and division within the sport. FIFA’s later USD 6.35 billion plan suggests that increased funding was possible without outside investors, although that funding still requires approval.[3]
Virtue ethics
Virtue ethics asks what a good steward of the global game would do. Honesty, humility and prudence suggest consulting before announcing, seeking independent valuations and listening to dissent. For UEFA, the virtues of justice and temperance ask whether its response is proportionate.
Walk it through: the Simple Decision Model
- Spot the issue: Whether to place a governing body’s commercial rights in an investor-backed subsidiary, and how to respond.
- Gather facts: Valuation, investor identities, governance safeguards and the views of members.
- Test options: Proceed; revise with safeguards; withdraw; fund development from reserves.
- Check codes and law: FIFA statutes, Swiss association law and conflict-of-interest rules.
- Decide and document: Approve through the Council and Congress with published analysis.
- Communicate and follow up: Consult confederations first and review governance afterward.
What’s settled and what’s contested
- Settled: FIFA proposed FFE on July 28, 2026, and withdrew it on July 31; UEFA threatened a boycott; UEFA filed four § 1782 applications; Infantino apologized to the Council for mistakes in how the project was handled.[1][2][3][4][5]
- Contested: whether anyone acted unlawfully; the valuation; whether UEFA’s legal action is accountability or politics; whether US courts will grant discovery.[9][10][11]
Why this case matters
The FFE episode shows how quickly commercial ambition can collide with governance norms in global sport. It raises lasting questions about who owns major competitions, how decisions affecting them should be made and how a sport’s institutions hold their leaders to account.
See also: Counting to Three: Infantino and FIFA’s Presidential Term Limit.
Key terms
- Stakeholders
- Everyone with something at stake in a decision: athletes, coaches, parents, officials, fans, employees, sponsors, media, communities and regulators, including the less visible ones.
- Trust
- The public’s belief that what they are watching is real. Integrity failures are ultimately failures of trust.
- Conflict of interest
- A situation where a person’s private interest could improperly influence a decision they make in an official role.
- Institutional accountability
- Structures that make a sport organization explain its decisions and face consequences: clear authority, transparency, appeals, independent oversight and enforcement.
- Commercialization
- The process of turning sport into a product and a business enterprise, with profit pressures that can compete with principle.
- Due process
- Fair procedures before a sanction: notice, a chance to respond, an impartial decision-maker and a right of appeal.
Definitions from the Ethics Cases glossary.
Discussion questions
- Who should 'own' the World Cup: FIFA, its member associations, or the players and fans who give it value?
- Was offering member associations up to USD 40 million for backing the plan a legitimate incentive or an improper inducement?
- Was UEFA's boycott threat a responsible way to resist the plan?
- Should UEFA pursue criminal proceedings after the plan was withdrawn, or keep the dispute within football?
- What governance reforms would prevent a similar episode?
Sources
- FIFA President tells Member Associations new subsidiary would be 'golden opportunity' to increase football development — FIFA
- Statement attributable to the FIFA President — FIFA
- FIFA President calls for unity at Council meeting and stresses commitment to serving FIFA Member Associations — FIFA
- In re Union des Associations Européennes de Football, No. 1:26-cv-25872 (S.D. Fla.), docket — CourtListener
- UEFA prepared to boycott World Cup over FIFA plans — RTÉ
- Uefa agrees to boycott Fifa competitions if World Cup sell-off plans proceed — The Guardian
- UEFA boycotts FIFA competitions over Gianni Infantino's $20 billion plan to sell World Cup stakes — NBC News / Associated Press
- Fifa scraps controversial World Cup investment plan — BBC Sport
- Uefa preparing criminal legal action against Infantino — BBC Sport
- FIFA challenges UEFA in court as Infantino reviews $2.1bn funding plan — Football Business News
- UEFA v. FIFA: Four Section 1782 Applications, Tracked — Legal Schmidt PLLC